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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the southern states struggled to respond 
to the civil rights decisions being issued by the U.S. Supreme Court 
as well as the new civil rights laws being passed by Congress.  The 
judicial battleground for this perfect storm of evasion and massive 
resistance was found in the “old” Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
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which encompassed the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, and Texas.1  In the “old” Fifth Circuit, a minority 
of liberal appeals court judges—sympathetic to the civil rights 
movement—used all legal and administrative power at their disposal 
to make sure that the federal district and appeals courts were com-
plying with the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate in Brown v. Board of 
Education.2  In their ground-breaking book A Court Divided: The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Politics of Judicial Reform,3 
political scientists Deborah J. Barrow and Thomas G. Walker care-
fully examined the political behavior of these aforementioned liberal 
appeals court judges and found evidence that Elbert Parr Tuttle, the 
Fifth Circuit’s chief judge from 1960 to 1967, was manipulating, or 
“gerrymandering,” the assignment of appeals court judges to both 
three-judge district court panels,4 and three-judge appellate court 
panels to guarantee that the panels had at least two liberal judges 
who would enforce the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings.5  
The finding that a federal court of appeals judge may have used 
his administrative powers to create judicial panels sympathetic to 
civil rights cases is hardly surprising to Barrow and Walker; the 
basic assumption of their entire study is that “federal judges in the 
United States are by nature and necessity politicians” or “black-
robed homo sapiens” who are “subject to the same forces that influ-
ence the behavior of other individuals.”6  Add Barrow and Walker:  
“A judge must always be cognizant of the obligations and responsi-
bilities of the judicial role, but putting on the black robe cannot be 
  
1.  DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM, 40–41, 56–
60 (1988). 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. See generally BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1. 
 4. Federal law authorized three-judge district court panels to hear specific types 
of cases, including civil rights and reapportionment cases.  The panel is composed 
of the original district court judge assigned to the case and at least one federal 
appeals court judge.  See generally Thomas G. Walker, Behavioral Tendencies in 
the Three-Judge District Court, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 407 (1973).  
 5. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 40–41, 56–60.  
 6. Id. at ix (citing S. Sidney Ulmer, Dissent Behavior and the Social Back-
ground of Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. POL. 580, 580 (1970)).  
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expected to neutralize an individual’s political nature.”7  Of course, 
the argument that judges achieved preferred policy outcomes by the 
selective interpretation of controlling legal principles is hardly a new 
insight.8  Barrow and Walker, however, examine the more interest-
ing question of whether an appeals court judge can take advantage of 
administrative rules—such as how judges are selected to sit on ap-
peals court panels—to pack panels with like-minded jurists, bring 
lower courts into compliance with the chief judge’s policy prefer-
ences, and achieve specific policy goals.9  
In highlighting the role that panel packing played in the “old” 
Fifth Circuit, Barrow and Walker contribute to a rich socio-legal 
literature that explores the mechanisms used for effective oversight 
and control in a judicial hierarchy.10  Nearly all judicial systems pro-
vide for some means of oversight, and research into the interplay of 
such systems and the legal actors situated within them is of interest 
to scholars of constitutional design, judicial administration, and judi-
cial decision making.11  In particular, the relative effectiveness of 
various mechanisms of hierarchical control has long been a central 
  
 7. Id.  
8. See generally JEFFREY SEGAL & HOWARD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).  
9.  BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 40–41, 56–60. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
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focus for students of socio-legal phenomena,12 as well as for scholars 
of social and political institutions more generally.13 
In common law systems, judicial institutions often face signifi-
cant challenges relating to oversight.14  Hierarchy is arguably the 
signature institutional trait of the U.S. federal courts, and social sci-
entists have long recognized the importance of that structure for the 
operation of those courts.15  Higher court oversight of the decisions 
of lower courts has been found to be important in a host of different 
contexts.16  Most of these studies have focused on the U.S. courts of 
appeals, investigating the influence of such factors as Supreme Court 
doctrinal trends on court of appeals decision making,17 as well as on 
more direct forms of monitoring such as en banc rehearings.18  Other 
studies have looked beyond the courts of appeals, either to the dis-
  
 12. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006); LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); VIRGINIA HETTINGER, STEFANIE LINDQUIST & 
WENDY MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INflUENCES ON APPELLATE 
DECISION MAKING (2006); DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS (2002); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(1994); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 1459 (2003); David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal 
as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 
(2003); Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and 
Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63 (2005).  
 13. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 
1976). 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
 17. See generally Klein & Hume, supra note 12; Donald R. Songer, Consensual 
and Nonconsensual Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals, 26 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 225 (1982); Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court on 
Trends in Economic Policy Making in the United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. 
POL. 830 (1987); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Im-
pact on Compliance and Outcomes, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990). 
 18. See generally Tracey George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Deci-
sion to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999); Tracey George & 
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Court of 
Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171 (2001). 
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trict courts19 or to other actors, including state supreme courts,20 liti-
gants,21 and even the agenda-setting of the U.S. Supreme Court it-
self.22 
Here, we take advantage of a unique characteristic of the proce-
dures of the U.S. courts of appeals—the discretion held by chief 
judges to designate district court judges to three-judge appellate pan-
els23—to examine empirically the importance of oversight and judi-
cial hierarchy on judges' behavior in those courts.  Specifically, we 
examine the extent to which decisions about the policy preferences 
of designated judges vary systematically with the ideological tenor 
of the chief judge himself, the court as a whole, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court.  More simply put, we ask: are district court judges se-
lected to sit on appeals court panels simply to help ease the workload 
of the federal courts of appeals, or are the chief judges of the courts 
of appeals free to take a page from Chief Judge Tuttle’s playbook 
and use the designation process to select district court judges that 
share the chief judges’ political preferences?  In Part II of this arti-
cle, we outline in detail the court of appeals designation process.  
Part III sets forth a series of expectations regarding chief judges’ 
decisions about the delegation decision.  We then examine those ex-
pectations empirically, using data on a random sample of court of 
appeals cases decided between 1925 and 1988.  Part IV outlines our 
data and methods, while Part V discusses our findings and Part VI 
  
 19. See generally Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to 
Courts of Appeals Policies: An Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217 (1980); Susan B. 
Haire, Donald R. Songer & Stephanie A. Lindquist, Appellate Court Supervision 
in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143 
(2003). 
 20. See generally Bradley C. Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. 
Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision. 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 109 (1973); Scott 
A. Comparato & Scott D. McClurg, State Supreme Court Compliance with the 
United States Supreme Court (2002) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL). 
 21. See generally Donald R. Songer, Charles M. Cameron & Jeffrey A. Segal, 
An Empirical Test of the Rational-Actor Theory of Litigation, 57 J. POL. 1119 
(1995). 
 22. See generally Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Stra-
tegic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme 
Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101 (2000). 
  23.  S. Res. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted). 
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briefly examines future research questions regarding judicial desig-
nation.  
II. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DESIGNATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
OF APPEALS 
The familiar structure of the modern federal judiciary has its 
roots in the Evarts Act.24  Passed by Congress in 1891, the Evarts 
Act dramatically restructured the federal judiciary by creating the 
federal courts of appeals.  The Act also affected the duties performed 
by federal court judges, including authorizing district court judges to 
sit by designation on three-judge appellate panels.  The statutory 
authority for judicial designation is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 292, 
which states that a chief circuit court judge may designate district 
court judges within the circuit (and from outside the circuit, if au-
thorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) to hear appeals 
on three-judge appellate panels.25  In other words, district court 
judges are permitted to sit by designation on three-judge appellate 
panels, hear appeals taken from federal district courts, vote on the 
merits of the appeal, and draft the panel opinion as if they were court 
of appeals judges.26 
The process by which district court judges are selected to sit by 
designation on court of appeals panels is illustrated in Figure 1.  It is 
especially important to note that each federal circuit follows strict 
procedures designed to guarantee that appellate judges are randomly 
selected to each three-judge panel, and that cases are randomly as-
signed to those panels.27  This is very different from the practices of 
the “old” Fifth Circuit studied by Barrow and Walker, in which a 
  
 24. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 292 (2006)).  
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).   
 26. Beyond the scope of this paper is the question of how the practice of select-
ing district court judges to sit by designation might run afoul of the United States 
Constitution.  For an excellent discussion on this point, see Richard B. Saphire & 
Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of 
District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States Court of Ap-
peals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 360 (1995).  
 27. See, e.g., 11TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. 34-2(b). 
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chief judge knew the exact case that a designated judge would be 
hearing.  There are no rules, however, which stipulate that the selec-
tion of a designated judge to complete an appellate panel is similarly 
conducted in a random fashion;28 instead, chief judges are given only 
loosely-bounded authority to designate judges as they see fit.29  As a 
practical matter, chief judges retain complete discretion to create a 
pool of designated judges from which to select and, more important-
ly, to hand-pick specific district court judges and assign them to pre-
existing appellate panels of two court of appeals judges.30  While the 
completed panels are then randomly assigned to blocks of cases—
thus preventing the deliberate assignment of specific panels to cer-
tain cases—chief judges nonetheless clearly have at least the poten-
tial to shape the composition of the circuit's three-judge panels31. 
The lack of institutional rules regarding designation provides 
scholars with a unique opportunity to study the impact of circuit-
level environmental factors on the actions of chief judges.  First, in 
making their designation decisions, chief judges are presented with a 
random stimulus: a court of appeals panel already consisting of two 
randomly-selected judges32.  Second, and more important, the fact 
that the subsequent assignment of cases to panels occurs randomly 
means that case-level factors do not (indeed, cannot) play a role in 
the designation decision33.  The designation process thus provides a 
valuable natural quasi-experiment for examining questions of judi-
cial behavior as well as greatly simplifying our analysis of the desig-
nation decision.34 
  
 28. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 26, at 361.  
29.  S. Res. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted). 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
 34. As a secondary matter, we would note that this discretion over district court 
judge designation is also potentially important for studies of the federal courts of 
appeals.  In fact, despite their nearly universal presence in the courts of appeals, no 
clear consensus has emerged regarding the treatment of district court judges sitting 
by designation in studies of those courts.  Compare Burton M. Atkins & Justin J. 
Green, Consensus on the United States Court of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 735, 744 (1976) (excluding designated judges in determining that 
panel structure of the U.S. Courts of Appeals permits conflict to be hidden within 
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It is interesting to note that, with the exception of Barrow and 
Walker, scholars have not focused on the strategic possibilities af-
forded chief judges by the designation of district court judges to ap-
pellate panels in the U.S. context.35  Scholars have, however, studied 
other institutional rules that provide chief judges with the discretion 
  
unanimous decisions); Burton M. Atkins & William Zavoina, Judicial Leadership 
on the Court of Appeals: A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in Race Re-
lations Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 701, 701–11 (1974); Virgin-
ia Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist & Wendy Martinek, Comparing Strategic and 
Attitudinal Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 131 (2004) [hereinafter Hettinger, Comparing Stra-
tegic and Attitudinal Accounts] (limiting analysis to decisions rendered by three-
judge panels composed of active or senior court of appeals judges); John P. 
McIver, Scaling Judicial Decisions: The Panel Decisionmaking Process of the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 749, 753 (1976) (excluding district 
court judges sitting by designation in order to isolate the nine judges and their 
working relationships with each of their fellow circuit judges); Donald R. Songer 
& Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Vot-
ing: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963, 963–
82 (1992) with Martha Anne Humphries & Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in 
Judicial Oversight of Federal Administrative Agencies, 61 J. POL. 212 (1999) (de-
liberately including designated judges in analysis).  Contra, Virginia Hettinger, 
Stefanie Lindquist & Wendy Martinek, The Role and Impact of Chief Judges on 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 91, 105 (2003) [hereinafter 
Hettinger, The Role and Impact of Chief Judges]; Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith 
& Reginald S. Sheehan, Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical 
Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963, 980 (1989); Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts 
of Appeals’ Review of Bureaucratic Action and the Politics of Protectionism, 50 
POL. RES. Q. 851-878 (1997) (examining the potential effects of designation on 
judicial behavior, while other studies are unclear on precisely how they treat the 
presence or absence of designated judges).  See, e.g., Virginia Hettinger, Stefanie 
Lindquist & Wendy Martinek, Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792 (2003) [hereinafter Hettinger, 
Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing]; Songer, supra note 17; Don-
ald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions 
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955–1986, 43 W. POL. Q. 317 (1990).  If 
there are systematic differences in the characteristics and behavior of designated 
judges vis-à-vis their appellate colleagues, then this broad inconsistency in treat-
ment is potentially troubling. 
35. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting 
Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 111–12 (1996). 
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to appoint judges to achieve certain goals.36  Moreover, one recent 
study found compelling evidence of ideologically-driven behavior in 
the making of panel assignments in both the Canadian and South 
African Supreme Courts.37  These two courts are similar to the cir-
cuit courts of appeals because chief judges have significant discre-
tion over panel assignments; to the extent that the same dynamics 
hold across the various systems, we have at least some reason to be-
lieve that judges in these systems might use designation in a policy-
driven fashion.38 
III. IDEOLOGY, OVERSIGHT, AND THE POLITICS OF DESIGNATION 
As noted above, the lack of formal rules governing the selection 
of district court judges to sit by designation provides at least the op-
portunity for chief judges to use the designation process to pursue 
their own goals.  We begin with the contention that judges in the 
courts of appeals are motivated by substantive political preferences.  
In addition to the widely-supported importance of such considera-
tions on judges’s decisions on the merits,39 scholars have amassed 
substantial evidence that policy-related factors also exert influence in 
other facets of court of appeals decision making, including panel 
assignments,40 opinion assignments,41 authorship of dissenting opin-
ions,42 and publication decisions.43  Accordingly, we begin with the 
  
 36. Id. 
 37. See Lori Hausegger & Stacia Haynie, Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use 
of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Appellate Divi-
sion, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 653 (2003). 
38.  Id. 
 39. See  J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM:  A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 
184–85 (1981); McIver, supra note 34, at 753, 755; Songer & Davis, supra note 
34, at 319–20; Songer & Haire, supra note 34, at 970, 978. 
 40. See Atkins & Zavoina, supra note 34, at 708.  
 41. See Burton M. Atkins, Opinion Assignments on the United States Courts of 
Appeals: The Question of Specialization, 27 W. POL. Q. 409, 427 (1974). 
 42. See Hettinger, Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing, supra note 
34, at 807; Hettinger, Comparing Strategic and Attitudinal Accounts, supra note 
34, at 130, 134. 
 43. See Songer, Smith & Sheehan, supra note 34, at 14. 
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expectation that chief judges will use the designation process to 
bring the law into accord with their own personal policy preferences 
by designating ideologically like-minded judges to panels.  At the 
same time, we suggest that chief judges will be constrained, both in 
their incentives to do so (by the ideological makeup of the existing 
panel) and in their ability to do so (by the possibility of oversight by 
the circuit sitting en banc or the U.S. Supreme Court).  We outline 
the contours of these expectations below. 
A. “Split” Panels 
At the broadest level, chief judges faced with the decision of 
whom to designate to an existing two-judge panel are presented with 
two circumstances: those two judges are either ideologically similar 
(what we term a unified panel) or they are ideologically different (or 
split).  Consider first the case of a split panel, consisting of one ideo-
logically conservative and one ideologically liberal circuit court 
judge.  Such a situation presents a chief judge with the greatest op-
portunity to affect the decisions of the panel, since he or she is effec-
tively appointing the swing vote.  In the absence of other constraints, 
our policy-based perspective would suggest that he or she would 
appoint a judge with an ideology similar to his or her own.  At the 
same time, however, a number of other factors suggest that his or her 
ability to do so effectively may be limited. 
The most important such factor is oversight: both the circuit as a 
whole (sitting en banc) and the U.S. Supreme Court may reverse 
what they perceive as incorrect panel decisions of the courts of ap-
peals.  The possibility of such a reversal is exacerbated to the extent 
that the panel's minority judge might act as a watchdog,44 bringing 
the actions of the panel to the attention of the circuit and/or the Su-
preme Court through dissenting opinions and/or requests for rehear-
ing en banc.  Note, however, that if the ideology of the chief judge is 
consistent with that of the panel's overseers, such considerations 
cease to be a concern.  Thus, for example, a conservative chief judge 
  
 44. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedi-
ence to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 
YALE L.J. 2155, 2175–76 (1998); Steven R. Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal: 
Evidence from the U.S. Courts of Appeals (1997) (Unpublished manuscript).   
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may designate an equally conservative district court judge to a split 
panel if the circuit and/or the Supreme Court are also conservative.  
If, however, there is a liberal majority at the circuit or Supreme 
Court level, the chief judge’s ability to select such a like-minded 
designee is reduced since the chances are relatively good that a con-
servative decision rendered by the panel would be revisited.  The 
reverse is true for liberals: the ability of a liberal chief judge to select 
a liberal designee will be constrained by the presence of conservative 
oversight at the circuit or Supreme Court level.  Put differently, we 
predict that the probability that a liberal chief judge will designate a 
liberal district court judge increases as the fraction of liberal judges 
on the circuit and/or the U.S. Supreme Court increases and that the 
reverse is true for conservative chief judges (that is, that they will be 
more likely to designate a conservative district court judge as the 
fraction of conservative judges on the circuit and/or the Supreme 
Court increases). 
More generally, our expectation for split panels is that the influ-
ence of the ideology of the chief judge on the identity of the design-
ee will depend on the ideological tenor of the court exercising over-
sight.  This in turn implies an interactive empirical model, of the 
form: 
 
Pr(Like-Minded Designee)   =    f [β0 + β1 (Conservative 
Chief Judge) + β2 (Conservative Circuit/Supreme Court) + β3 
(Conservative Chief Judge (1) × Conservative Cir-
cuit/Supreme Court) + u] 
 
Equation (1) specifies that the probability that a chief judge des-
ignates a like-minded district court judge is a function f(•) of three 
things: how conservative (or liberal) that chief judge is; how con-
servative or liberal the circuit as a whole (and/or the Supreme Court) 
is; and the interaction of the two.  The multiplicative interaction of 
the two components allows for the effect of each variable on the 
probability of a like-minded designee to depend on the value of the 
other.45 
  
 45. See generally Thomas Brambor, William Clark & Matt Golder, Understand-
ing Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. ANAL. 63 (2006) 
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The discussion above suggests that, for split panels, we would 
expect that on a liberal circuit (or in the presence of a liberal Su-
preme Court), a conservative chief judge would be less likely to des-
ignate a like-minded judge than would a liberal.  Statistically, this 
expectation is borne out if the estimated value of β1 is less than zero.  
Similarly, for liberal chief judges (that is, when Conservative Chief 
Judge = 0), the probability of designating a like-minded judge 
should decrease as the fraction of conservatives on the circuit as a 
whole or on the Supreme Court increases; this implies that β2, the 
coefficient on the term for Conservative Circuit/Supreme Court, 
should also be less than zero.  Finally, we expect these effects to re-
verse for conservative chief judges and/or conservative oversight: on 
a conservative circuit or in the presence of a conservative Supreme 
Court, a conservative chief judge will be more likely to designate a 
like-minded district court judge; for a conservative chief judge, the 
probability of picking a like-minded designate increases as the frac-
tion of conservatives on the circuit or the Supreme Court increases.  
These last expectations imply that the sign of the coefficient on the 
interaction term β3 is positive and that the relative size of that coeffi-
cient is greater than either β1 or β2.  These expectations are summa-
rized in column two of Table 1, located in the appendix. 
B. Unified Panels 
Panels consisting of two ideologically-similar circuit court judg-
es present a different designation scenario for chief judges.  The sig-
nature characteristic of such unified panels is that, as a practical mat-
ter, the chief judge's decision about who to designate will not affect 
that panel's decisions to the same degree as in split panels, since he 
or she is no longer selecting the pivotal voter.  Accordingly, in des-
  
(outlining the use of multiplicative interaction terms for testing conditional expec-
tations in statistical models); Bear Braumoeller, Hypothesis Testing and Multipli-
cative Interaction Terms, 58 INT’L. ORG. 807 (2004) (explaining that when a sta-
tistical equation incorporates a multiplicative term in an attempt to model interac-
tion effects, the statistical significance of the lower-order coefficients is largely 
useless for the typical purposes of hypothesis testing).  For a recent illustration of 
this approach, see generally Christopher Zorn, William D. Henderson & Jason J. 
Czarnezki, Working Class Judges, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 829 (illustrating the interpreta-
tion of regression models with multiplicative interactions). 
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ignating judges to such a panel, chief judges might seek to achieve 
one of two possible (and, in some cases, inconsistent) goals: select-
ing watchdog judges and administrative efficiency. 
The first of these two goals is directly implied by our assumption 
about chief judges’ interest in influencing policy.  As we mentioned 
above, watchdogs are partisans who, by dissent or other means, will 
signal to the circuit when the panel makes decisions at odds with the 
rest of the circuit, the Supreme Court, and/or the chief judge him-
self.46  These signals, in turn, increase the likelihood of either en 
banc review47 or certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.48 
It is useful to note some important elements of this watchdog 
theory.  First, the ability of a designee to act as a watchdog depends 
on a very specific set of conditions being present; in particular, the 
ideological orientation of the overseeing courts must differ from that 
of the two judges on the unified panel to which she or he is designat-
ing.  In the absence of that difference, the expectation would be that 
the reviewing court would ratify the decision of the panel, and so the 
choice of a designated judge would be expected to have little effect 
on the final outcome of a case.  Second, from the perspective of the 
chief judge, the value of a watchdog also depends on whether or not 
the chief judge is in ideological agreement with the overseeing court; 
a liberal chief judge, for example, would hardly be expected to des-
ignate a conservative watchdog to call the actions of a liberal panel 
to the attention of a more conservative circuit.  Taken together, these 
two points make clear that the use of watchdog judges cuts both 
ways:  just as we would expect a liberal chief judge on a liberal cir-
cuit to designate a liberal watchdog to a conservative panel, we 
would also expect that a conservative chief judge in the same situa-
tion would endeavor to ensure that his or her designee was conserva-
tive (in order to prevent watchdog-like behavior and so minimize the 
chance of en banc or Supreme Court review). 
The fact that a chief judge’s incentives to designate a watchdog 
depend on his or her ideological congruence with both the existing 
  
 46. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 44, at 2175–76; Van Winkle, supra note 44.   
 47. See George, supra note 18, at 247.  
 48. See Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher Zorn, Sophisticated 
Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 570 
(1999). 
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panel and the overseeing court implies that the marginal influence of 
both the ideology of the chief judge and that of the circuit or Su-
preme Court on the probability of a like-minded designee will also 
depend on the ideology of the two existing panelists.  In this respect, 
a model for unified panels differs from that for split panels, in that it 
requires a three-way interaction among the composition of the panel, 
the ideology of the chief judge, and the ideology of the overseeing 
court.  In terms of the model in equation (1), the expectations stem-
ming from the watchdog theory would be that, for a panel consisting 
of two liberal court of appeals judges, we would expect to find no 
direct effect of Conservative Chief Judge (that is, the value of β1 
would be zero), while the direct effect of Conservative Cir-
cuit/Supreme Court (β2) would be less than zero, and the interactive 
term (β3) would be greater than zero.  The first of these expectations 
is due to the fact that, when both the panel and the overseeing court 
are liberal, the ideology of the chief judge should have little or no 
impact on the likelihood of a like-minded designee.  The second is 
because, given both a liberal panel and a liberal chief judge, the like-
lihood of a like-minded (liberal) designee increases as the overseeing 
court grows more conservative.  Finally, the third is due to the fact 
that, when the overseeing court is conservative, both conservative 
and liberal chief judges should strongly prefer to pick like-minded 
designees—the former to act as watchdogs and the latter to ensure 
that such behavior did not occur.  In a similar fashion, the expecta-
tions for unified conservative panels are somewhat reversed; there, 
we would expect that the direct influence of the Conservative Chief 
Judge variable (β1) on the probability of designating a like-minded 
judge would be negative, while that of Conservative Cir-
cuit/Supreme Court (β2) would be negative and that for the interac-
tion term (β3) would be positive.49  All of these expectations are pre-
sented in columns three and four of Table 1.50 
A second possibility for unified panels is that the chief judge, 
recognizing that the choice of designee will have little or no effect 
  
 49. See generally Brambor, Clark & Golder, supra note 45. 
 50. The Appendix contains a table of expectations for each of the 2  2  2 = 
eight possible ideological combinations of panel (liberal or conservative), chief 
judge (liberal or conservative), and overseeing court (liberal or conservative), 
along with the corresponding contrasts in Equation (1). 
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on the panel's decisions, will attempt to maximize the decision mak-
ing efficiency of the panel.  This administrative efficiency motiva-
tion suggests that, at the margin, we would expect a chief judge to 
select a designated judge who would increase the probability of what 
we term ideological harmony on the panel.  Such ideological harmo-
ny contributes to the efficiency of panel decision making by making 
it more likely that panel decisions will be issued quickly without oral 
argument,51 speeding the review of amicus briefs,52 minimizing 
lengthy delays stemming from contentious debates among the judg-
es, and reducing the extent of writing and circulation of multiple 
drafts of concurring or dissenting opinions.  In addition, an ideologi-
cally homogenous panel is less likely to grant a party's petition for a 
panel rehearing.53  Empirically, this view suggests that, irrespective 
of their own ideology, chief judges will designate judges with ideo-
logies consistent with the existing panel members.  With reference to 
the model in (1), the administrative view leads us to expect that the 
effect of Conservative Chief Judge (β1) will be negative for ideolog-
ically liberal panels and positive for ideologically conservative ones, 
while the effects of Conservative Circuit/Supreme Court will be zero 
across all panels; these expectations are outlined in columns five and 
six of Table 1.54  Importantly, the expectations derived from the ad-
ministrative efficiency view present a stark contrast to those based in 
policy considerations. 
  
 51. On appeal, the panel may decline to grant a motion for oral argument if all 
three judges unanimously agree that argument is unnecessary.  FED. R. APP. P. 
34(a)(2).  
 52. FED. R. APP. P. 29.  This rule only permits the filing of amicus briefs by leave 
of court or the consent of all parties (with some exceptions).  Id. 
 53. FED. R. APP. P. 40. 
 54. A third possibility is that chief judges act at all times as if the panel was split; 
such behavior might occur, for example, if judges do not vote precisely along 
ideological lines.  If this is the case, then a chief judge’s behavior in the face of 
unified panels ought to be more-or-less consistent with that when the panel is split, 
and we would expect precisely the same relationship between designation, a chief 
judge’s ideology and that of the circuit or Supreme Court as discussed above. 
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C.  Workload and Designation 
As we mentioned in Part II, the conventional wisdom states that 
the courts of appeals have turned with greater frequency to federal 
district court judges for assistance with their rising workloads.  In 
their recent survey of circuit clerks and chief judges, Saphire and 
Solimine found that workload concerns were among the most fre-
quently cited reasons for the use of designated judges.55  Yet studies 
examining district court judges sitting by designation have uncov-
ered widely varying levels of district court designation, ranging from 
a high of 47%56 to lows between 12% and 24%.57  Drawing upon 
Songer’s United States Court of Appeals Data Base, Phase I, we 
find that district court judges participated in 3,389 (or 22.46%) of the 
15,086 non-en banc decisions in Songer’s data for the 1925–1988 
period.58  Figure 2 presents the annual proportion of three-judge de-
cisions in Songer’s data in which a designated district court judge 
participated from 1925 to 1988.  The data points in Figure 2 are 
broadly consistent with earlier findings regarding the incidence of 
designations: aggregate annual percentages average 21.0% over the 
entire period, and range from a low of 5.5% in 1953 to highs of 
42.3% in 1930 and 37.1% in 1981.59  In accord with the earlier stud-
ies of Green and Atkins, and Wasby, we note an increase in the inci-
  
 55. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 26, at 362. 
 56. See Justin J. Green & Burton M. Atkins, Designated Judges: How Well Do 
They Perform?, 6 JUDICATURE 358, 363 (1978). 
 57. See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American 
Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 236 tbl.3 (1999); Stephen L. Was-
by, Of Judges, Hobgoblins, and Small Minds: Dimensions of Disagreement in the 
Ninth Circuit (September 2–5, 1982) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, Denver, CO). 
 58. DONALD R. SONGER, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DATA BASE, PHASE I (last 
updated Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm. 
These data are a probability sample of decisions of the United States courts of 
appeals published in the Federal Reporter from 1925 to 1988.  We rely on 
Songer’s coding of the identity of judges sitting on each panel to identify district 
court judges sitting by designation.  Specifically, we code decisions as containing 
a designated district court judge if one or more of the judge codes in Songer’s data 
are identified as such. 
59.  Id. 
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dence of designations during the late 1960s and 1970s.60 The highest 
rates occurred in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and again in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, while the lowest levels are found in the 
1940s and 1950s.61  Moreover, designation rates clearly track closely 
with aggregate workload levels over time; the Pearson’s r correlation 
between the two variables is 0.57, an effect that is statistically differ-
entiable from zero with a high degree of confidence (p <.001).62 
The apparent importance of workload in the incidence of desig-
nation suggests that workload-related factors may play a role in the 
practice of designating district court judges to the courts of appeals.  
In particular, workload concerns may suppress the ability of chief 
judges to select like-minded panelists from the district courts.  To 
address this possibility, we include a control variable for the cir-
cuit/year-specific workload in our models of the designation decision 
below, with the expectation that its effects will be negative. 
IV. DATA, OPERATIONALIZATION, AND METHODS 
We assess the determinants of the designation process using 
Songer’s (1997) data on the U.S. courts of appeals between 1925 and 
1988.  We restrict our analysis to the 3,320 cases in which a district 
court judge sat by designation, and on which data are available for 
all variables.  For all district court judges appearing in Songer’s data, 
we coded their political party affiliation, as well as that of their ap-
pointing president.63  Our response variable is whether (coded one) 
or not (coded zero) the political party of the designated judge is the 
same as that of the chief judge of the circuit responsible for the des-
  
60.  See Atkins & Green, supra note 34; Wasby, supra note 57.  
61.  Songer, supra note 58. 
62.H.T. REYNOLDS, JANET BUTTOLPH JOHNSON, & JASON D. MYCOFF, POLITICAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS,140-142 (2007).  
 63. Several sources were used to gather data on district court judges, including 
Directory of American Judges, The American Bench, the Almanac of the Federal 
Judiciary, and Directory of Minority Judges in the United States.  If the judge did 
not self-identify as a Democrat or a Republican, we used the appointing presi-
dent’s party as a surrogate. 
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ignation decision.64  To address matters relating to caseload, we in-
clude a variable measuring the nominal workload of active judges on 
the circuit in any given year.  From Songer’s (1997) Appendix 5, we 
obtained the total number of published decisions in each circuit in 
each year.  We then divided this number by the number of active 
judges sitting on each circuit in each year, as derived from Zuk et 
al.,65 to obtain a measure of the effective caseload per active judge.  
This variable ranges from a low of just under seven cases per judge 
to a high of 141.5 cases, with a mean of 44.9 cases per judge per 
year.  While imperfect—for example, it fails to account for the in-
creasing use of senior judges over time66—it is nonetheless an accu-
rate proxy for each court's true workload. 
We assess our hypotheses regarding the influence of ideological 
factors on the designation process through three key independent 
variables.  First, we note the party identification of the circuit's chief 
judge, coded one for Republicans and zero for Democrats.  Second, 
we operationalize oversight by higher courts in two ways.  As a 
measure of circuit-level ideology, for each case we include a varia-
ble measuring the proportion of the circuit who are Republicans in 
that year.  Similarly, we measure Supreme Court ideology as the 
fraction of Supreme Court justices who are Republicans.  Following 
  
 64. Recognizing that party identification is an imperfect surrogate for a judge’s 
ideology, we opt for it nonetheless.  Party identification is generally a good indica-
tor of political ideology, and has been shown in other studies to be a good predic-
tor of the behavior of judges on the courts of appeals.  E.g., HOWARD, supra note 
39, at 184–85; Donald Songer, Factors Affecting Variation in Rates of Dissent in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: BEHAVIORAL 
STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE COURTS # (Sheldon Goldman & Charles Lamb 
eds., 1986); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of 
Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 504–05 (1975); Songer and Davis, 
supra note 34, at 319–20.  Also, to account for potential differences between 
Southern and non-Southern Democrats, we conducted separate analyses for South-
ern (defined as the 4th, 5th, and 11th) and Northern circuits.  While smaller Ns led 
to slightly larger standard error estimates in these analyses, the substantive direc-
tion of the results did not change. 
 65. GARY ZUK, DEBORAH J. BARROW & GERARD S. GRYSKI, MULTI-USER 
DATABASE ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF UNITED STATES APPEALS COURT JUDGES, 
1801–1994 (1997). 
 66. See Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political 
Economy of Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 517–20 (2005). 
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equation (1), we include as well an interaction between the chief 
judge and overseeing court variables.  Finally, for each case in our 
data, we record the party identification of the two circuit court judg-
es comprising the panel prior to designation, and we undertake sepa-
rate analyses for split (one Democrat and one Republican) and uni-
fied (two Democrats or two Republicans) panels.67 
As we note above, the fact that cases are randomly assigned to 
panels after the designation decision has been made permits us to 
omit case-specific factors from the model, since any such character-
istics are by construction unrelated to the designation decision.  At 
the same time, because of the panel-like structure of our data, there 
is a significant possibility of interdependence across cases.  In par-
ticular, cases arising in the same circuit in a given year may be relat-
ed due to similarities in case types, regional effects, or other factors.  
To address this issue, we estimate a series of probit models incorpo-
rating random effects for each circuit-year.68 
These models—which are appropriate when the outcome varia-
ble is a dichotomous outcome, as it is here—include a separate inter-
cept (or baseline) term for each circuit in each year of the data.  A 
key requirement of such models is that the independent variables be 
unrelated to those unit-specific effects; failure to meet this require-
ment can lead to parameter estimates and standard errors that are 
badly biased.  Here again, the structure of the designation process 
outlined in Figure 1, in the appendix, ensures that this requirement is 
  
 67. We are also aware that the seniority of the district court judge may affect 
designation patterns.  For example, chief judges often designate newly-appointed 
district court judges as part of their socialization process, while judges with senior 
status might be called up more often due to their reduced workloads at the district 
court level.  While such considerations are potentially important, we leave inquiry 
into the possible effects of seniority to future work, for a number of reasons.  First, 
because our data represent only a sample of all court of appeals cases, it is impos-
sible for us to ascertain if the first instance of designation for a particular judge is, 
in fact, his or her first time on the higher court.  This difficulty is compounded by 
our lack of knowledge of the effective pool from which district court judges are 
chosen; without this information, we have no way of assessing chief judges’s deci-
sions regarding the selection of senior versus active district court judges.  Finally, 
with respect to senior status, the precise date on which district court judges take 
such status is often hard to determine, making such distinctions very difficult to 
make in practice. 
 68. See, e.g., CHENG HSIAO, ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA (2d ed. 2003). 
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met: because court of appeals judges are randomly selected for pan-
els, we can be certain that the panels’ pre-designation compositions 
are unrelated to those effects. 
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Results of our analyses are presented in Table 2 in the appendix.  
We note at the outset that workload has no appreciable influence on 
the propensity of chief judges to designate their ideological allies to 
court of appeals panels.  In light of existing work, this is unsurpris-
ing; Cohen, for example, highlights the ability of the courts of ap-
peals to respond to increasing workloads without substantially af-
fecting their decision making process.69   More generally, one might 
expect that, to the extent that workload is a factor in designation, its 
influence should appear only on the incidence of such designation 
itself, but not necessarily on the identity of the designee.70 
Broadly speaking, our findings with respect to the influence of 
ideology and oversight are consistent with a pattern of chief judge 
behavior motivated by policy considerations; moreover, these results 
are remarkably consistent across a range of different specifications 
and conditions.  Columns two through five of Table 2 report results 
that operationalize oversight at the circuit level.  The clear pattern 
  
 69. JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF 
COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS (2002).  
 70. To further address this issue, and to support our contention that there is no 
relationship between designation and case-related factors, we also estimated a two-
stage probit model with selection, where the first stage indicated whether the panel 
contained a designated judge and the second was the party of that designee.  See 
WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS § 21.6.4, at 713–14 (5th ed. 2003).  
In those analyses, we included an indicator for the year of the decision, a count of 
amicus curiae briefs in the selection stage, and fixed effects for each circuit.  Such 
a model allows us to assess whether case-related factors such as the importance of 
the case (using the number of amici present in a given case serves as a proxy for 
the case’s importance) are related to the incidence of designation and hence 
whether the results in Table 2 are biased by selection effects.  In all cases, we 
found no relationship between case-related factors and designation decisions, and 
the estimates of the selection effects parameter were small and insignificant.  The-
se results are available from the authors upon request. 
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that emerges corresponds precisely to that expected from the policy 
influence perspective: the significant, negative estimate for β1 indi-
cates that, irrespective of the composition of the panel (unified or 
split, Democratic or Republican), the presence of a Democratic ma-
jority at the circuit level makes Republican chief judges less likely 
(and Democratic chief judges more likely) to select a member of 
their own party to sit by designation.  At the same time, the large, 
positive estimate for the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) indi-
cates that the reverse is true on Republican-dominated circuits: there, 
Republican chief judges are more likely (and Democrats less likely) 
to tap their ideological allies for service on the courts of appeals.  
Equally important is what we do not find; in particular, our re-
sults offer little or no support for the administrative perspective and 
only marginal support for the watchdog perspective.  The consistent-
ly large and significant estimates for β3, particularly in the models of 
unified panels, are telling evidence against the administrative theory.  
Similarly, evidence for the watchdog hypotheses is partial at best.  
For the models of unified panels, we can distinguish between the 
watchdog and policy influence hypotheses only via the differential 
effects across Republican and Democratic panels; while we find no 
significant direct effects among the Democratic-majority panels 
(column five), we also find no significant interaction effect. 
These same findings persist—and, in fact, are even stronger—
when we operationalize oversight in terms of Supreme Court ideolo-
gy.  Those results are presented in columns six through nine of Table 
2.  To illustrate the size of these effects, Figure 3 plots the predicted 
probabilities (along with their associated 95 percent confidence in-
tervals) of designating a like-minded judge, for both Democratic and 
Republican chief judges, as a function of the Republican proportion 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.71  The results are striking: for Republi-
can chief judges, increasing the degree of sympathetic oversight 
from 0.09 to 0.73 (that is, from one Republican justice to seven, ef-
fectively the full range of values in the data) yields a corresponding 
increase of 0.76 in the probability of a Republican designee (from 
  
 71. Results in Figure 2 are based on the analysis in column seven of Table 2, 
holding the unit-level effects constant at their mean value of zero: similar results 
are obtained if we base our predictions on the other Supreme Court results pre-
sented in Table 2. 
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0.09 to 0.85).  The same increase in the Republican composition of 
the Supreme Court causes a decline in the probability of a Democrat-
ic judge designating a fellow Democrat, from 0.54 to 0.40.   In both 
instances, the magnitude of these changes exceed their confidence 
intervals, leading us to conclude that, particularly for Republican 
chief judges, the presence of judicial oversight exerts a strong effect 
on those individuals’ designation decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of district court judge designation on the U.S. 
courts of appeals is a unique example of a practice in which chief 
judges have almost unconstrained discretion over a potentially cru-
cial aspect of the decision-making process.  Scholars are increasingly 
aware of the significance of this power72 as well as the importance of 
the chief judges in the operation of the circuit courts of appeals more 
generally.73  Our analysis of the means by which those judges are 
selected provides clear and consistent evidence that chief judges, in 
making designation decisions, tend to choose individuals with simi-
lar ideologies.  In this respect, our results mirror those of Hausegger 
and Haynie,74 who suggest that the practice of judicial designation 
provides at least the potential for policy-motivated behavior across a 
range of different institutional contexts.  Our results make equally 
clear, however, that the extent to which judges are willing and able 
to do so depends on their institutional context—in particular, the 
potential for oversight provided by the circuit en banc and/or the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
But while our results regarding designation are both robust and 
substantial, it is important to note that the selection of judges with a 
particular ideological bent is only the first step in influencing the 
direction of the law.  Whether or not these judges behave in a man-
ner consistent with the designating chief judge’s intentions remains 
an empirical question, though a number of previous studies suggest 
  
 72. See, e.g., Robert J. Brown Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of 
Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV 1037, 1066 (2000). 
 73. See Hettinger, The Role and Impact of Chief Judges, supra note 34, at 93. 
 74. Hausegger & Haynie, supra note 37, at 651, 653. 
2012 HIDDEN POLITICS OF JUDICIAL DESIGNATION 91 
that, owing to internal pressures on three-judge panels, a given 
judge’s influence over case outcomes is likely to be small.75  Until 
the extent of such influence is more precisely determined, the practi-
cal value of policy changes to limit the influence of the designation 
process remains uncertain. 
More broadly, our findings thus support two general proposi-
tions: that chief judges’ decisions about designation are motivated by 
policy factors, and these same judges behave strategically by taking 
into consideration the likely actions of other actors in making deci-
sions relating to the operation of the courts.  A long line of empirical 
research on the courts of appeals support the notion that such judges 
are driven by policy goals; in the second case, our work squares with 
other recent studies of court of appeals decision making,76 as well as 
those that expand the notion of strategic behavior beyond case-level 
votes to include such other institutional phenomena as the selection 
of decision-making instruments.77  At the same time, our work con-
trasts with a number of recent studies that have called into question 
the conditional nature of court of appeals behavior,78 suggesting the 
importance of additional inquiries into the contours of constraints in 
the federal judicial hierarchy. 
  
 75. See, e.g., Atkins & Green, supra note 34, at 740. 
 76. See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 44, at 2175; Van Winkle, supra note 44. 
 77. See, e.g., Joseph Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evi-
dence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 81 (2002). 
 78. See, e.g., Hettinger, Comparing Strategic and Attitudinal Accounts, supra 
note 34, at 134; Klein & Hume, supra note 12. 
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VII. APPENDIX 
EXPECTATIONS FOR DESIGNATION DECISIONS ON UNIFIED PANELS 
UNDER THE WATCHDOG MODEL 
 
Unified Liberal Panel 
  Circuit/Supreme Court Oversight 
  Liberal  Conservative 
Chief 
Judge 
Liberal Either ↔ (β2) < 
0 
Liberal 
 ↕ (β1) = 0  ↕ (β1 +  β3) > 
0 
Conservative Either ↔ (β2 +  




Unified Conservative Panel 
  Circuit/Supreme Court Oversight 
  Liberal  Conservative 
Chief 
Judge 
Liberal Liberal ↔ (β2) 
> 0 
Either 
 ↕ (β1) > 0  ↕ (β1 +  β3) = 
0 
Conservative Conservative ↔ (β2 +  
β3) < 0 
Either 
 
Note: Cells denote the ideology of the expected designee under 
the watchdog perspective.  Arrows between cells denote the corre-
sponding contrasts in Equation (1).  Note that the expectations imply 
β3 > 0 for liberal panels and β3 < 0 for conservative ones.  This prop-
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TABLE 1: EXPECTED INFLUENCE OF CHIEF JUDGE AND 
CIRCUIT/SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY ON THE PROBABILITY OF 






















Chief Judge < 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 > 0 
Conservative  
Circuit /  
Supreme Court 
< 0 > 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 
Conservative 
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Note: Response variable is whether (=1) or not (=0) the desig-
nated district court judge was Republican.  Numbers in parentheses 
are coefficient estimates; standard errors are in parentheses.  One 
asterisk indicates p < .05, two indicate p < .01 (one-tailed).  This 
proposition is discussed more fully above in Section V. 
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FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF COURT OF APPEALS CASES WITH DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGES SITTING BY DESIGNATION AND COURT OF APPEALS 
WORKLOAD, 1925–1988 
             
Note: Dashed line plots the mean number of cases decided per 
active judge in each year; smooth line is the annual percentage of 
cases in which a district court judge sat by designation in the U.S. 
courts of appeals.  Estimates are based on Songer’s (1997) data.  
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FIGURE 3: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF A SAME-PARTY DESIGNEE, 
BY CHIEF JUDGE AND SUPREME COURT PARTISANSHIP 
          
Note: Lines indicate predicted probabilities, holding Workload 
and the random effects constant at their means; bars denote 95% 
confidence intervals.  Solid line is for panels overseen by a Republi-
can chief judge; dashed line is for a Democratic chief judge.  Results 
are for a unified panel (column seven in Table 2).  This proposition 
is discussed more fully above in Section V. 
